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This paper examines elements of British tax policy and discusses their implications for the US,
where several recent proposals would mirror aspects of the British system. These include
reducing filing requirements under the individual income tax, indexing capital gains for inflation,
cutting mortgage interest deductions, enacting a value added tax, and integrating the corporate
and personal income taxes. The paper also discusses implications of the poll tax for tax reform.
Britain and America have made different choices involving equity, efficiency, simplicity and other
goals. These choices offer the chance to help identify the impact of tax policy.
JEL classification: H20.
I. INTRODUCTION
Tax policy debates in the US are noteworthy for their frequency, intensity and
largely inward-looking focus. Very seldom is reference made to the experiences of
other countries, and the references that are made are often seriously misleading.
Yet many of the major reform ideas put forth in recent years in the US are closely
related to programmes that already exist in other countries.
This paper examines selected elements of British tax policy and experience and
discusses their implications for US tax policy. Britain is an instructive choice for
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this purpose because the British tax system is fundamentally like the American
system in many respects, but contains many features that relate directly to changes
currently or recently proposed in the US.
The systems are most obviously similar in that they rely on income and payroll
(social security) taxes for the bulk of their revenue. Both countries experienced —
indeed, led — the drive in the 1980s to reduce tax rates and broaden tax bases that
caught on around the world and was encapsulated in a series of changes made in
the 1980s by Conservative governments in the UK and in the US Tax Reform Act
of 1986.
But many features of the British system differ significantly from that of the
US. For example, the personal income tax is based on individual rather than
family income, and only about 10 per cent of taxpayers have been required to file
returns in recent years. Capital gains are indexed for inflation, while deductions
for mortgage interest and other items are much more limited than in the US. In
general, relative to its American counterpart, the British income tax emphasises
simplicity, downplays the role of social policy and limits attempts to obtain finely-
tuned measures of income. These differences date to the origins of the income tax
in each country.
The British corporate income tax is partially integrated. Excise taxes and a
value added tax raise a significant amount of revenue. The UK recently lived
through an unsuccessful attempt to replace local government property taxes with
poll taxes.
Analysis of each of these differences may contain important lessons for
academics and policymakers alike. However, it should be clear at the outset that
Britain has not found any way to ‘solve’ the various trade-offs between equity,
efficiency, simplicity and other goals. Rather, the lessons stem from the fact that
the UK has chosen different points (hopefully, but probably not) on the frontiers of
these trade-offs. Thus the lessons to be drawn here are not in generating
conclusions about what is right or wrong about tax policy, but in providing
evidence on the costs and benefits of different policies and in locating the biggest
gaps between ‘textbook’ analyses and the real world. Another set of issues
involves assessing the political and other factors that have led to the differences in
policy in the first place. (For one such discussion, see Keen (1997).)
The next section provides a very brief overview of the current status and recent
evolution of British taxes, along with some comparisons with the US. Sections III
to VI discuss what I view as some of the major differences between the systems, as
noted above.
The final section offers some concluding thoughts, but all of the issues
discussed below leave plenty of scope for new cross-country and within-country
analyses that could sharpen the conclusions. Such analyses — for example, of the
impact of alternative forms of capital gains taxation on investment and
entrepreneurship — need to consider the interaction of several tax policies as wellWhat Can America Learn from the British Tax System?
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as other existing regulations or economic conditions. Thus many of the
conclusions are, of necessity, of a limited or tentative nature.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE BRITISH SYSTEM
1
Total government tax revenues were 37.6 per cent of GDP in Britain in 1995,
compared with 31.3 per cent in the US. This difference has fluctuated over time,
and stood at 7.7 percentage points in 1970, 6.0 points in 1980 and 7.2 points in
1990.
Table 1 describes the composition of tax revenues in Britain for 1993–94 and
in the US for 1993. The taxes in the table are grouped by US convention. (British
TABLE 1
The Composition of Taxes in the UK and in the US









Income tax 25.6 8.6 36.0 9.7
Individual income tax 25.2 8.4 — —
Capital gains tax 0.4 0.1 — —
Corporate income tax 6.4 2.1 8.2 2.2
Social insurance 17.0 5.7 23.2 6.3
National Insurance 17.0 5.7 — —
Social security and Medicare — — 23.2 6.3
Broad and band consumption
taxes
16.8 5.6 7.9 2.1
VAT 16.8 5.6 — —
General sales tax — — 7.9 2.1
Specific consumption taxes 10.9 3.6 2.6 0.7
Alcohol 2.3 0.8 0.6 0.2
Tobacco 3.0 1.0 0.6 0.2
Transportation fuel 5.6 1.9 1.4 0.4
Property taxes 9.0 3.0 10.8 2.9
National non-domestic rates 5.5 1.8 — —
Council taxes 3.5 1.2 — —
Estate and gift taxes 0.6 0.2 1.0 0.3
All other taxes 13.7 4.6 10.3 2.8
Total 100.0 33.4 100.0 27.0
Sources: OECD Revenue Statistics, 1965–1995; Dilnot and Stears (1997); Fleener (1997); Budget of the US
government, fiscal year 1998.Fiscal Studies
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tables typically classify capital gains as a separate tax from the individual income
tax.) Both countries obtain the most revenue from their individual income tax and
social insurance payroll taxes, though the US collects more from each than the UK
does. The countries collect about the same proportion of their revenue from
corporate income taxes, though the annual figures vary over time. Property taxes
and estate and gift taxes account for a somewhat smaller share of revenues in the
UK than in the US.
The major difference shown in Table 1 is the importance of consumption taxes.
VAT raises about one-sixth of all tax revenues in Britain, more than double the
proportion of revenue raised by general sales taxes in the US. Taxes on specific
consumption items also differ. Taxes on alcohol, tobacco and transportation fuel
totalled 10.9 per cent of tax revenues in Britain compared with only 2.6 per cent in
the US.
Given these differences, effective tax rates on different types of economic
activity may be expected to vary in the two countries. Quick and Neubig (1994)
present data on measures of average tax rates. They estimate that, in 1991,
consumption tax revenues totalled about 19.4 per cent of aggregate consumption
in the UK compared with 6.2 per cent in the US. Economy-wide average tax rates
for payroll taxes and combined individual and corporate income taxes were similar
in the two countries. The average total tax rate on labour income — including
income, payroll and consumption taxes — was estimated to be 36.5 per cent in the
UK, compared with 29.3 per cent in the US. While such information is instructive,
data on effective marginal tax rates would be more useful in understanding the tax
incentives faced by firms and households. However, obtaining systematic,
comparable and current data is difficult.
There is a general sense in both Britain and the US that the British system,
especially the income tax, has fewer deductions or loopholes. It would be
interesting to quantify this difference, but it is quite difficult to do so.
2
Table 2 reports estimates of the distribution of the burdens of taxation in the
two countries. Most striking, the British tax system provides virtually no net
redistribution of income on an annual basis. This is in part due to the presence of
taxes that appear to be regressive with respect to annual income, such as VAT and
excise taxes. In addition, substantial redistribution occurs through government
spending in the UK. In the US, most redistribution occurs through the spending
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Effective Tax Rates, by Income Quintile: UK and US, 1994
Per cent
Income quintile UK US
1 (bottom 20%) 39.4 5.0
2 33.9 14.9
3 (middle 20%) 36.5 19.5
4 35.8 22.3
5 (top 20%) 34.2 27.9
Sources: Calculations based on data from Economic Trends (1994, HMSO, London) as reported in Dilnot and
Stears (1997, Table 17); Congressional Budget Office (1994).
A series of Tax Acts has significantly altered the British tax system since the
late 1970s. One major theme has been to reduce income tax and raise consumption
taxes — VAT and excise taxes. The basic VAT rate was raised from 8 per cent to
15 per cent in 1979 and to 17.5 per cent in the early 1990s. Taxes on alcohol,
tobacco and transportation fuel have also increased substantially. The reduction in
income taxes has been tilted toward the high end of the income distribution, while
the increase in consumption taxes has been borne by all income groups (Hills,
1988).
Within the income tax, rates have fallen dramatically. The top rate on wage
income fell from 83 per cent in the late 1970s to 40 per cent by 1988. An
additional surcharge of up to 15 per cent on investment income, which raised the
top rate to 98 per cent, was eliminated. The ‘basic’ rate faced by most taxpayers
fell from 33 per cent in tax year 1978–79 to 24 per cent by 1996–97, and is now
23 per cent.
The base changed in several ways. Deductions for mortgage interest have been
curtailed. At the same time, however, thresholds for the income tax brackets have
been raised substantially in real terms, the treatment of capital gains has been
liberalised significantly and several new saving incentives have been introduced.
Income tax rates for large corporations fell from 52 per cent in 1980 to 33 per
cent by 1996–97; tax rates on small corporations fell from 40 per cent in 1980 to
24 per cent by 1996–97. At the same time, expensing of some types of corporate
investment was swept away in 1984 and replaced with a significantly less
generous set of depreciation schedules that helped equalise the present value of
depreciation allowances across assets. The extent of integration between personal
and corporate taxes has been reduced.
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In the estate tax, the exemption has grown dramatically but remains lower than
the US exemption. The large number of estate tax rates that applied earlier have
been collapsed to a flat 40 per cent. National Insurance (social security) taxes
have increased by several percentage points, the employer ceiling for contributions
has been abolished and the base has broadened to cover some fringe benefits.
At the local level, in 1989, residential property taxes were replaced with a
‘community charge’, or poll tax, which was abandoned in two years and replaced
with a new tax that is based on property value and number of adults living in a
household.
The new Labour government elected in the Spring of 1997 has proposed
additional changes that would further reduce corporate tax rates and the extent of
integration between corporate and personal taxes, cut mortgage tax relief by one-
third, provide targeted investment incentives and change other items. Other recent
developments in British taxation look decidedly American. There has been recent
speculation about adding additional tax brackets, moving to a two-tier capital
gains tax — depending on how long the asset is held — and introducing tax
incentives modelled after US Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and earned
income tax credits. The new Labour government even has its own ‘no new taxes’
pledge — Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, promised in the campaign
at one point not to raise income tax rates for five years and at another not to raise
income tax rates on those with income below £40,000.
III. THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
The unit of taxation in the UK is the individual, although a system of joint filing
was used before 1990. The tax base includes wages, interest, dividends, some
capital gains, pension benefits, unemployment benefits, royalties, property income,
business income and other items.
The personal allowance (the equivalent of a US exemption) was £3,765 in tax
year 1996–97 (which ended in April 1997).
4 Married couples receive an additional
allowance of £1,790 that can be allocated arbitrarily across spouses. Taxpayers
who are blind, recent widows or elderly receive additional allowances. There are
no child allowances, but there is a child benefit spending programme.
After subtracting the exemption and any allowances, the marginal tax rate in
1996–97 was 20 per cent on the first £3,900 of taxable income, 24 per cent — the
‘basic rate’ — on additional income up to £25,500 and 40 per cent on higher
levels of income. The basic rate has since been reduced to 23 per cent. It is
estimated that, in 1996–97, about 25 per cent of taxpayers faced the lower rate, 67
per cent faced the basic rate and the remaining 8 per cent faced the top rate as
their marginal tax rate. Allowances and tax brackets are indexed for inflation.
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1. Filing
From an American perspective, probably the most interesting aspect of the British
income tax is that very few citizens actually have to file tax forms. Filing is
usually unnecessary because the tax structure is sufficiently simple and because
withholding regulations generate, in principle at least, exactly the right amount of
withheld taxes at source on wages and other income.
The main instrument of exact withholding is the ‘pay-as-you-earn’ (PAYE)
system. PAYE is a cumulative withholding scheme that applies to wage income.
Workers provide their employers with certain basic information, including marital
status and age, which is used to calculate withholding allowances. Employers then
withhold taxes as directed by the PAYE formulas. The key to exact withholding is
that the process is cumulative. At each pay cheque, the taxes withheld equal the
difference between cumulative taxes owed (on cumulative earnings to date) and
cumulative taxes paid until then. Thus employees who stop working in the middle
of the year none the less have the correct amount withheld. When employees
change jobs, information on their cumulative wages and taxes is provided to their
new employers, and the calculations continue. In contrast, in the US, taxes on
wages are withheld, but withholding is neither cumulative nor intended to be exact.
Withholding wages at source is a necessary but by no means sufficient method
of ensuring that most people do not have to file tax returns. Coupled with PAYE,
a number of features of the British tax system enhance the feasibility of a non-
filing system. First, exact withholding is facilitated by requiring that taxpayers file
individual, rather than joint, returns and by setting the tax brackets so that a
majority of taxpayers face the same marginal rate.
Second, taxes on capital income are structured in a way that reduces filing
requirements. Taxes on interest are withheld at a 20 per cent rate. Personal-level
taxes on dividends are in effect also withheld at a 20 per cent rate, as discussed in
Section V. Capital gains on owner-occupied housing are completely exempt from
taxes. On other assets, only inflation-adjusted capital gains in excess of £6,300 per
person per year are subject to taxation. Indexing, however, cannot be used to turn
a gain into a loss or to increase a loss. The effect is that very few households pay
capital gains taxes. The first £3,250 of net rental income on rooms in the owner’s
home is exempted from taxation. Tax-preferred saving is incorporated via payroll
deductions for pensions. Taxpayers may also contribute to saving incentive plans,
but these contributions are limited and are ‘back-loaded’ — the contributions are
not deductible but earnings and withdrawals are not taxed. Thus moving funds
into and out of such accounts does not generate tax consequences.
Third, expenditures that would qualify as itemised deductions in the US receive
much less generous treatment in the UK. Subsidies for mortgage interest are
provided, but not through tax filing and not, in fact, in a way that is at all related
to taxes. Limited interest relief is provided at source. In 1996–97, the subsidy was
at a 15 per cent rate, regardless of the taxpayer’s marginal rate. For example, aFiscal Studies
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household with a 10 per cent mortgage would pay 8.5 per cent interest on the first
£30,000 of the loan, while the lender would collect the remaining 1.5 per cent
interest on that amount from the government. The full amount of interest on the
remaining balance is charged to the household.
A limited amount of charitable contributions can be made through a payroll
deduction plan, and taxpayers can also ‘covenant’ income — earmarking the
income to charity for four years or more. The contribution generates a deduction
at the basic rate of tax. The charity recovers this amount (the basic rate times the
contribution) from the Inland Revenue (the British tax agency). Single
contributions between £600 and £5 million may also be deducted.
Deductions for employee business expenses are generally very strict and
allowed only for items that are ‘wholly, exclusively and necessarily’ related to
business. Medical expense deductions have been extremely limited. (Of course, the
structure of health expenditures is quite different in the UK from that in the US.)
There are no general deductions for personal interest payments, casualty losses or
local taxes.
Each of these features — individual filing, exact withholding of taxes on
wages, a wide tax bracket applying to the basic rate, the treatment of capital
income and the treatment of deductions — reduces the need for individuals to file
tax forms in order to reconcile tax liability with taxes withheld. Despite all of
these features, however, about 10 per cent or more of British taxpayers have to
file tax returns in any given year. These are largely high-income taxpayers with
asset income (taxes on which have been withheld at a lower rate), those with
capital gains above the exempted amount and those with self-employment income.
5
What can be learned from these policies? First, although filing requirements
are clearly an administrative issue, they appear to have important effects on the
structure of tax policy. The British income tax is marked by systematically
different choices from its US counterpart. The system has fewer rates, fewer
deductions and more withholding. There are (currently) no dependent allowances,
earned income tax credits, alternative minimum taxes, income-based phase-out of
allowances, income-based cap on deductions, child tax credits or education tax
credits. In general, then, the British income tax features more compromises in
favour of simplicity and in opposition to measuring income or ability to pay
exactly. There are also fewer attempts to enact social policy through the tax code.
This should not be read as British indifference to such social concerns; many such
programmes are enacted through the spending side instead.
It seems plausible that at least some of these structural differences are due to
differences in withholding patterns and the administrative features of the tax code.
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In particular, once withholding and non-filing become important aspects of the tax
code, many special tax subsidies and loopholes may become more difficult to
design and enforce.
For example, there is a long tradition of withholding at source under the British
income tax. In 1799, Pitt imposed a 10 per cent tax on all incomes above £200.
The tax raised £5–7 million annually for three years, which was much less than
had been predicted by the revenue estimators of the time. The revenue shortfall
was due at least in part to ‘gentle’ administration of the tax law by local
commissioners and to widespread evasion. In 1802, the tax was repealed, but in
1803 Addington restored the income tax (apparently under the name of a property
tax) and included withholding at source. By 1806, the tax raised about £20
million, even though the tax rate was only half as large as that under Pitt’s income
tax. The income tax was repealed again in 1816, but since the tax was restored in
1842, withholding at source has remained a prominent feature (Sabine, 1980).
Exact withholding of wage income was established in the 1940s, when the
financing requirements of the Second World War led to a 150 per cent increase in
the number of taxpayers over a two-year period. The immediate goal of exact
withholding was to reduce the number of mistakes and ease the computational
burdens imposed on the large number of inexperienced taxpayers.
In contrast, the US income tax has always contained a variety of special
deductions. Even the original 1913 version of the modern income tax included
deductions for mortgage interest, state and local income and property taxes,
casualty and theft losses, and life insurance investment income, and excluded
interest income from state and local bonds. Deductions for employer-provided
health care and charity, as well as special treatment of capital gains, were
introduced within 10 years. Of the estimated $403 billion in tax expenditures in
the 1993 US tax code, over two-thirds were due to provisions enacted before 1929
(General Accounting Office, 1994). Although the US did initiate withholding in
the 1940s when the income tax was expanded greatly to finance the war,
withholding was never intended to be exact and households were still required to
file returns. This not only made it possible to enact social policy through the tax
code, but made the tax code a highly visible way to enact such programmes.
If non-filing is expected to generate large administrative and compliance
savings, the British experience may be somewhat surprising. The total
administrative and compliance costs of a tax system include those faced by
individuals, firms and government. Since so few individual forms are filed in
Britain, individuals’ compliance costs seem much more likely to be higher in the
US (see, for example, Blumenthal and Slemrod (1992)). But costs imposed on
government and firms are likely to be higher in Britain. Kay and King (1990) cite
Inland Revenue administrative costs of about 2 per cent of revenue collected. This
is between three and four times the comparable figure for the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) relative to total US revenues. Comparable estimates of costs borne
by firms in the two countries are difficult to obtain.Fiscal Studies
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In any case, complaints about the complexity and administrability of the
British tax system cannot be ignored. Kay and King (1990) argue forcefully that
the compliance and administrative costs are significant. Recent events suggest that
the British are moving toward a self-assessment system more like that of the US
(Johnston, 1996). The interaction of more self-employment, more contract work
and problems with the exact withholding system has pushed the system in this
direction. Up to one-third of British taxpayers are expected to be required to fill
out forms in the near future. A new system of self-assessment — where taxpayers
report all of their own income, claim deductions and calculate their own tax bill —
apparently has broad support from both political parties, even amid criticisms that
the forms appear to be quite complex.
Recently, Senator Dole and Representative Gephardt have independently
proposed no-return systems for a substantial portion of US taxpayers. In 1994,
about 40 per cent of taxpayers filed the simplified 1040A and 1040EZ forms, and
about 78 per cent of all returns faced a marginal rate of 0 or 15 per cent. This
suggests that a substantial portion of the population could be integrated into a no-
return system. But current US withholding formulas are not designed to be exact
for any but the simplest situations, and so would need to be amended.
A tax agency reconciliation (TAR) system is an alternative approach to
eliminating tax filing. In a TAR system, withholding is typically as close to exact
as possible, but the tax agency calculates each household’s tax at the end of the
year and sends a bill or refund.
6
Gale and Holtzblatt (1997) estimate that, with minimal changes in the structure
of tax policy, but with significant changes in tax administration, withholding at
source could be established for wages, the earned income tax credit, interest,
dividends, pensions, Individual Retirement Account distributions and
unemployment insurance benefits. If so, then up to 56 million, or almost half of
all, US taxpayers could be placed on a TAR system. These are households that
have income only from the sources mentioned and do not claim itemised
deductions.
The saving in compliance costs may not prove significant, however. Of the 56
million households, 44 million currently file the relatively simple 1040A and
1040EZ returns and probably spend very little time filling out forms to begin with.
For example, Blumenthal and Slemrod (1992) provide survey evidence that 30 per
cent of households spent 0–5 hours complying with the income tax (including
keeping records, learning about the tax rules, filling out the tax form and other
items) and an additional 15 per cent spent less than 10 hours. Almost half made no
financial expenditure on tax preparation and an additional 17 per cent paid less
than $50.
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Adding large numbers of additional taxpayers to a TAR system may prove
more difficult, and at the very least would require changes either in the structure of
policy and/or in how policies are administered. Even if taxpayers with the forms of
income mentioned above and who had itemised deductions and capital gains were
brought into the system, which would be difficult, only 6 million more taxpayers
would be covered.
No-return systems raise several additional considerations. Many taxpayers may
experience significant psychic or emotional costs when filing any income tax
return. Thus, even if the vast majority of affected taxpayers already face relatively
simple tax situations in an objective sense, a no-return system could still provide
significant benefits to certain households. However, in the US, unless state income
taxes were also shifted to a no-return system, the reduction in filing and psychic
costs would be likely to be minimal. Notably, there are no local income taxes in
the UK.
Second, US taxpayers clearly like receiving refunds, perhaps as a form of
forced saving or for some other reason. A cumulative withholding system would
be likely to eliminate refunds, but could in principle be designed to over-withhold
systematically. In a TAR system, however, refunds could still be obtained.
Third, under either type of no-return system, citizens would be likely to want to
examine the agency-provided forms carefully and would have to keep records to
do so. It is unclear whether US taxpayers would be willing to trust the IRS to
calculate their taxes for them. This might be compounded by the notion that a no-
return system is likely to leave people less aware of the tax system they face and
hence of the tax consequence of their actions. Indeed, numerous commentators
note what they view as the typical British citizen’s ignorance of the tax system
(see Kay and King (1990), for example). In contrast, a recent proposal by
Representative Armey would have done away with withholding and required
people to file tax payments every month. The idea behind the proposal was to
make people more aware of the tax system in general and the tax burdens they
face.
Fourth, a TAR system would place much more stringent requirements on
taxpayers to file forms with the IRS and on the IRS to process the forms
promptly. Whether each of these tasks could be accomplished in a timely and
accurate manner is unclear.
2. Marriage
An income tax can embody at most two of the following three principles: marginal
tax rates should rise with income; families with equal income should pay equal
taxes; and the tax system should be neutral with respect to marriage.
The British system, like the American, violates the third principle. But,
whereas the American system contains a complicated pattern of marriage taxes
and marriage subsidies, the British income tax contains only marriage subsidies.Fiscal Studies
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This is accomplished directly via individual filing and the additional allowance
that married couples can allocate across their respective returns. An additional
benefit to married couples stems from the ability, in an individual filing system, to
allocate capital income to the family member with the lowest marginal tax rate.
The British system violates the second principle as well. Individual filing with
rising tax rates implies that, controlling for total income, married couples with
unequal income will in general pay more tax than married couples whose income
is distributed equally.
3. Housing
Since housing is both a consumption good and an investment good and generates
income, it is potentially exposed to a wide variety of taxes. The treatment of
housing under VAT and the property tax is discussed in Sections IV and VI.
Under the income tax, imputed rent from housing, net of interest and
maintenance costs, was taxed in years prior to 1962. Imputed rental values were
determined based on periodic government valuations of property. By 1962,
however, the imputed rents were still at pre-war levels, and the government
decided to abandon the tax on imputed rent rather than update the rental amounts.
The British system has never taxed capital gains on individuals’ main
residence, but some sort of mortgage interest relief has always been provided.
When tax subsidies for most forms of borrowing were eliminated in 1974–75,
subsidies for interest on the principal private residence were retained, subject to a
loan limit of £25,000. No subsidies were provided for mortgages on second
homes. The limit was raised to £30,000 in 1983–84 and has stayed fixed ever
since. It now applies to the sum of loans against each property.
7 Tax relief in
earlier years was provided at the taxpayer’s marginal income tax rate. More
recently, the subsidy has been provided only up to a fixed rate, which was set at
25 per cent, then reduced to 20 per cent and, in 1995, reduced to 15 per cent for
new loans. The new Labour government has proposed cutting the rate to 10 per
cent.
These policies raise several interesting issues. First, mortgage interest relief has
been effectively divorced from the tax system. The statutory rate of subsidy and
the loan limit are independent of marginal tax rates. Second, because £30,000 is
well below the average new mortgage loan, mortgage subsidies provide almost no
incentive at the margin for most taxpayers. Third, the decline in the value of
mortgage interest subsidies has been gradual but gigantic. By 1996, the price level
in Britain was 5.5 times its 1974 level. Over the same period, the loan amount that
could be subsidised rose by 20 per cent (to £30,000), so that the real loan limit fell
by 78 per cent. Over the same period, interest rates have also fallen dramatically,
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and, as noted above, the rate of subsidy is much lower currently than in the past.
These factors have combined to reduce the subsidy to a tiny fraction of its former
value.
8
It is very difficult, however, to find any trace of these changes in aggregate UK
data. Home-ownership rates in the UK rose from 52.7 per cent in 1974 to 66.8 per
cent in 1994. By comparison, US home-ownership rates were stagnant at about 64
per cent during this period. The ratio of mortgage debt to GDP also rose in the
UK, from 25 per cent in 1974 to 56 per cent in 1994. This exceeds the increase in
the US, where the ratio rose from 47 per cent to 64 per cent over the same period.
Both mortgage debt as a percentage of the housing stock and the housing stock as
a percentage of private fixed capital stock rose more in the UK than in the US over
this period. These trends, of course, are due to many other factors besides the
reduction in the value of the mortgage interest subsidies. For example,
privatisation of public housing in the 1980s undoubtedly raised home-ownership
rates in the UK, and liberalisation of financial markets accelerated the rise in
mortgage debt (Attanasio and Banks, 1997).
Subsidising mortgage interest at a fixed, low rate, rather than allowing
mortgage interest deductions, could have significant appeal for the US. Suppose
the deduction were converted to a credit at a 15 per cent rate, the lowest marginal
tax rate. This would significantly reduce the cost of mortgage interest subsidies
and reduce the overall level of subsidies to housing, which are quite generous in
the US. It would also be a very progressive tax shift, as it would have minimal
impact on the taxpayers in the 15 per cent marginal tax bracket and, if it were
refundable, would assist those in the 0 per cent tax bracket. Estimates suggest that
reducing the subsidies would be unlikely to hurt home-ownership rates
significantly, if at all (Green and Reschovsky, 1997; Capozza, Green and
Hendershott, 1996).
9
A major constraint on such proposals in the US is the alleged firestorm of
protest that would occur were policymakers to touch such a sacred cow. In that
light, it is interesting to note that the reduction in mortgage subsidies in Britain has
been gradual and has been supported by ruling parties on the right and on the left.
4. Capital Gains
Capital gains taxes were introduced in the UK in 1965. Only real capital gains
that have accrued since 1982 are taxable now, and the first £6,300 per person is
                                                                                                                             
8For example, if the interest rate fell by one-third, the tax rate against which the deduction occurs fell by half and the
real loan limit fell by four-fifths, the current subsidy would be worth less than 10 per cent of the subsidy in 1974.
9The debate largely centres around the effects on the price of housing. See Capozza, Green and Hendershott (1996)
and Holtz-Eakin (1996) for divergent views.Fiscal Studies
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exempt from taxation in each year. Real gains less the exempt amount are added
to the individual’s income and taxed at ordinary income tax rates.
10
Both indexing and the exemption level raise several interesting issues.
Opponents of indexing in the US have argued that such a change would not be
feasible. The British experience, at first glance at least, refutes that claim, but any
refutation should be highly qualified. First, it is notable that indexing cannot be
used to convert a gain into a loss, or to raise the value of a loss, and that interest
payments are not tax-deductible at the personal level in Britain. Each of these
features diminishes the opportunity to use indexing to engage in tax-sheltering
activities, and none of them is commonly raised when indexing is proposed in the
US. Second, indexing does not achieve the goal of taxing real income. For most
taxpayers with capital gains in Britain, the gains are fully exempt from taxation
either because of the large exemption level or because assets such as housing,
which comprise a large portion of most households’ wealth, are exempt from
capital gains taxation. Third, it is unclear how well the system of capital gains
taxes operates. Data on the evasion rates and compliance and administrative costs
associated with indexing are difficult to obtain.
The large exemption is interesting in its own right. Suppose the US exempted
the first $20,000 in capital gains for joint filers and the first $10,000 for all other
filers. Calculations from the 1994 IRS public use file indicate that the exemption
would reduce the number of taxpayers with taxable capital gains by 89 per cent,
so that only about 1 per cent of taxpayers paid capital gains taxes, but would
reduce taxable capital gains by only 29 per cent. Thus, in the absence of changes
in realisation patterns, such an exemption would greatly reduce the number of
taxpayers facing capital gains taxes but would reduce capital gains revenues by a
smaller amount. These figures indicate the simplification potential of an
exemption.
In practice, however, people would change their behavioural patterns to take
advantage of the exemption. Formal evidence suggests that the elasticity of the
timing of capital gains realisations with respect to taxes is quite high (Burman and
Randolph, 1994) and casual evidence suggests that much activity of this sort
occurs in Britain currently. Such behaviour would reduce both the number of
people who had to pay capital gains taxes and the revenue yield. Indexing gains
for inflation would reduce both items further.
The net result of the treatment of capital gains is that very few people pay
capital gains tax in Britain, and the tax raises almost no revenue, accounting for
only 0.4 per cent of all taxes and 1.6 per cent of taxes raised by the income tax
plus the capital gains tax (see Table 1). In the US, in contrast, federal capital
gains taxes alone account for about 2.5 per cent of all tax revenue and 7 per cent
                                                                                                                             
10Capital gains tax relief is also available for entrepreneurs who sell their assets upon retirement. As in the US, the
death of the owner does not trigger capital gains tax payments under the income tax.What Can America Learn from the British Tax System?
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of federal income taxes (Burman and Ricoy, 1997).
11 Thus capital gains tax
revenues are roughly five to six times larger as a percentage of GDP in the US
than in the UK.
It is unclear, however, which country treats capital gains more generously at
the margin, for taxable investors. Indexing and preferential rates of taxation are
alternative methods of reducing the tax rate on nominal gains. In principle, the
relative generosity should vary by asset and time period. For example, since 1982,
the S&P 500 has risen in the US by about 660 per cent, while the price level has
increased by only 66 per cent. Hence, a 29 per cent exclusion, as has been
provided in the US for high-income taxpayers in recent years,
12 would have been
much more valuable at the margin than the British system of indexing combined
with taxing real gains at the ordinary income rate. The latter would have provided
an effective exclusion of about 10 per cent for nominal gains at the margin.
Clearly, results for other assets and other time periods will vary.
While the notion that the income tax should tax real income is a sound one in
principle, the British experience suggests that indexing of capital gains for
inflation should be considered in the broader context that includes the tax rates on
capital gains, the tax treatment of interest payments, the exemption level for
capital gains and rules about when indexing may not be used. To a large extent,
the British system of taxing capital gains appears to be an abolition of gains taxes
for almost all households, plus positive taxation of large gains at the margin, in
order to reduce large-scale tax arbitrage. The lack of visibility may be one reason
why the taxation of capital gains barely appears on the radar screen of major
issues in British tax policy, whereas capital gains taxes are hotly contested in the
US.
5. Saving Incentives and Pensions
Personal saving rates for the US and UK have followed different trends. The US
rate fell about 4 percentage points between the early 1980s and 1987 and has
remained low. The British rate fell by over 8 percentage points between 1980 and
1988 and then rebounded in almost as dramatic a fashion, rising 5.6 percentage
points in four years before levelling off. These trends, of course, are affected by
many factors other than tax policy. For example, financial liberalisation appears
to have been an important part of the saving decline in the 1980s in both countries,
with Britain experiencing a dramatic rise in personal liabilities relative to personal
income, even relative to the increase that occurred in the US. The run-up in equity
values, social security reform, budget deficits and other factors may also have
played important roles in saving trends.
                                                                                                                             
11These estimates are based on ‘stacking’ capital gains income last. That is, the estimates calculate income and
taxes due without capital gains, and then add capital gains to income and calculate the increase in taxes.
12As of 1996, taxpayers in the highest tax bracket faced rates of 39.6 per cent on ordinary income and 28 per cent
on capital gains. This is equivalent to a 29 per cent exclusion of capital gains income for those taxpayers.Fiscal Studies
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Tax policy toward saving offers another potential source of the differential
trends. The bulk of personal saving in both countries is directed toward assets with
generous tax treatment (Banks and Blundell, 1994). Private pensions and housing
receive treatment more favourable than just not taxing the return on saving. Like
the US, Britain has also experimented with a variety of other tax incentives for
saving. These schemes — TESSAs, PEPs and PPPs, described below — provide
an effective tax rate of zero on the return to saving.
Tax-Exempt Special Savings Accounts (TESSAs) were introduced in 1990.
Any individual aged 18 or over was eligible to open a TESSA in an approved
financial institution. Contributions could total £3,000 in the first year, and up to
£1,800 in each of the next four years, subject to a total of £9,000 overall.
Contributions were not deductible, but interest was entirely free of income tax if
the principal was left in the account for five years. Withdrawal of the principal
would trigger tax payments, but not penalties, so a TESSA, even under the worst
circumstances, had at least as generous tax treatment as ordinary saving. The net-
of-tax interest could be withdrawn as it arose without losing the tax preference.
By 1992, there were 3.5 million TESSA accounts (out of about 22 million
households in the UK). Thus about 15 per cent of households took out TESSAs,
roughly equivalent to IRA take-up rates in the US after two years of universal
eligibility.
It should be clear that TESSAs are very close substitutes for taxable interest-
bearing accounts. Notably, about 95 per cent of households with TESSAs also
held other interest-bearing accounts. These households also tended to hold larger
TESSA balances than others. Like IRAs, TESSAs tended to be held by wealthier,
older households, which could more easily substitute existing funds into these
accounts. Banks, Blundell and Dilnot (1994) present preliminary evidence
consistent with the view that increases in TESSA balances were offset to a very
large degree by reductions in other interest-bearing accounts. Given the revenue
costs of TESSAs (from the forgone tax on interest), they conclude that TESSAs
probably did not raise private saving much, if at all, and may well have reduced
national saving.
Personal Equity Plans (PEPs) were introduced in 1986 and expanded in
subsequent years.
13 Contributions are not deductible, but investments that are
retained for one year, with reinvested dividends, are untaxed. The tax benefits of
PEPs, however, were initially almost non-existent for small investors because of
the high exemption on capital gains and because, as explained below, dividends
were already effectively not taxed at the individual level, at least for taxpayers in
the lowest tax bracket. Expansion of the contribution limits led to bigger take-up
in subsequent years, but PEP ownership remains highest among older and high-
income households. PEPs are likely to be very good substitutes for equity holdings
for such households, and most PEP holders had other direct equity holdings.
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Banks, Blundell and Dilnot (1994) find evidence of significant substitution
between PEPs and other equity holdings.
Britain has also moved toward replacing its unfunded public pension at the
margin with a pre-funded private alternative; this may have contributed to an
increase in the saving rate as well.
14 Britain has a three-tier pension system. The
first tier (the basic benefit) is a state-supported minimum annuity payment that is
financed out of progressive National Insurance contributions made by workers and
employers. Basic benefits are about 15 per cent of average male earnings and are
indexed to the price level, and so are expected to fall to 7–8 per cent by 2030. The
third tier consists of conventional private pensions and other saving.
The second tier is more complex, consisting of a State Earnings-Related
Pension Scheme (SERPS) and private alternatives. In 1978, SERPS was
introduced to provide a benefit of one-quarter of average wages in the highest 20
years of earnings, subject to earnings limits. Accrual formulas for SERPS
entitlements were cut in 1986 and again in 1995. Combined with SERPS being
indexed to retail prices rather than wages, these cuts suggest a large reduction in
replacement ratios in the future.
Most workers, however, have exercised their option to contract out of SERPS,
with 50 per cent of workers now in occupational pension schemes (employer-
provided defined benefit plans) and an additional 28 per cent in private personal
pension schemes (PPPs). When the personal pension option was initiated in 1988,
workers were allowed to contract out to an individual account or employer-
provided defined contribution plan. The government provided that workers who
chose this option would have 5.8 percentage points of their National Insurance
contributions redirected to the private pension. Also, an additional rebate of 2 per
cent of covered earnings was offered for those who had not already contracted out.
In addition, the rebate was grossed up to take account of the income tax relief on
an individual’s pension contributions — yielding a total contribution of 8.46 per
cent of eligible earnings. Given the generosity of the programme and the large
accompanying volume of advertising, the option turned out to be very popular.
15
Workers also have the option of contributing additional amounts to their
personal pension. Total contribution limits are a function of salary and age and
rise from 17.5 per cent of covered earnings for those aged 17 to 35, up to 40 per
cent for those 61 and over.
It is unclear how these tax incentive plans have affected national saving.
Estimates in Disney and Whitehouse (1992) indicate that, for about 80 per cent of
workers, a government contribution of less than 8.46 per cent of salary would
have been sufficient to induce them to contract out. This suggests that the option
                                                                                                                             
14See Disney and Johnson (1997), Disney and Whitehouse (1992) and Banks, Blundell and Dilnot (1994).
15The rebate has been cut back and is now structured more generously toward older workers than toward younger
workers.Fiscal Studies
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created substantial positive income effects that could have raised consumption and
thereby reduced private saving.
About 60 per cent of workers with PPPs make no contribution to their PPP
above the contracted-out rebate, incentive payment and income tax relief. For this
group, current disposable income is the same as if they were still in SERPS, but
their wealth is higher. This suggests that, if anything, they would increase their
consumption. For the other 40 per cent, who do contribute beyond their National
Insurance payment, some of the extra contribution may be new saving.
As an illustrative calculation, suppose that the 40 per cent of workers who
contributed additional amounts contributed twice as much as the ones who only
contributed their National Insurance contribution, and that all of such additional
contributions were new saving. Then 
2/7 of all contributions to PPPs would
represent net additions to national saving. This seems to be an upper bound for the
proportion of contributions that would be new saving (under the assumption that
workers who contributed above their National Insurance contribution contributed
double what other workers contributed). However, the additional contributions
were tax-deductible and thus reduced public saving, all workers may have saved
less in other forms because of the income effects of PPPs, and workers who
contributed more than their National Insurance contribution may have financed
part or all their additional contributions from existing assets or funds they would
have saved anyway. Thus the net effect is unclear.
IV. THE VALUE ADDED TAX
The presence of a significant value added tax (VAT) is the single largest structural
difference between the US and UK tax systems. Although the US imposes sales
taxes at the state and local levels, these generate only about half as much revenue
as VAT does in Britain.
The standard VAT rate is 17.5 per cent, with a rate of 5 per cent applied to
domestic fuel. VAT systems provide special treatment of various goods and
services in different ways. Zero-rated goods do not have net VAT levied on the
final good or upon the inputs used in its creation. That is, the seller of a zero-rated
good owes no VAT, but may claim credits for the VAT paid on inputs. Exempt
goods do not have VAT levied on the final good sold to the consumer, but firms
cannot reclaim the VAT paid on inputs, so they face effective VAT rates between
zero and the standard rate, depending on the fraction of value added at the retail
level. About 25 per cent of consumer expenditure in the UK is on zero-rated
goods. These items include most food, new dwellings, passenger transport, books,
newspapers and magazines, prescription medicine and children’s clothing. About
15 per cent of consumer expenditure is exempt. This category includes rents,
private education, health services, postal services, finance and insurance, and
burial and cremation. Broadening the base of VAT has proven very difficult in
recent years.What Can America Learn from the British Tax System?
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Perhaps the most notable feature of VAT, and certainly the least examined in
the US, is the extent to which the provisions of VAT are dictated by international
convention. European countries have jointly set certain parameters of the value
added tax in a series of ‘directives’ over the last several decades. Prior to 1992,
VAT rates were unrestricted by the directives. Currently, the standard VAT rate is
not less than 15 per cent, but reduced rates can apply to certain targeted goods as
noted above.
The elimination of border controls in 1993 — part of a larger European agenda
which includes removing domestic preferences in public purchases, exchange
controls and restrictions on inter-country mergers — causes additional problems
for VAT and creates the possibility of fraudulent claims since VAT on exports is
rebated.
16
It is unclear how important the limited autonomy over VAT really is. To some
extent, Conservative governments in the 1980s may have used the European
dictates as externally imposed reasons to do what they wanted to do anyway —
raise the importance of VAT and reduce income tax. It is also unclear how
important such problems might be for the US, were it to adopt a VAT.
Presumably, one of the benefits of doing so would be the ability to co-ordinate
with other countries, but a destination-based VAT would not be difficult to
enforce internationally as long as the US did not maintain completely open
borders.
The textbook view of the VAT is that it is simple, cheap to administer and self-
enforcing. These attributes apply to the British VAT only with important
qualifications, if at all. As noted above, the VAT base exempts or zero-rates a
significant amount of consumption. Note also that most health care is provided
publicly in Britain and is not subject to VAT. In applying the VAT in the US,
there may be pressure to exempt or zero-rate health care. The VAT base, however,
is narrower in Britain than in many other European countries, which raises hope
that an American VAT could be relatively broad-based.
The UK employs a credit-invoice VAT — firms calculate their sales, calculate
the VAT due on the sales and then take a tax credit for VAT that has been paid by
others on the items the firm purchased.
17 In principle, an enforcement advantage of
a credit-invoice VAT is the ability to match invoices from sellers and receipts of
                                                                                                                             
16The current set of proposals would change the parameters of VAT to conform with the absence of border controls.
The specific components include: abolition of zero-rating exports in exchange for extending the VAT ‘chain’ to
include cross-border transactions; uniform VAT rates and bases across countries; allocation of VAT revenues across
European countries in relation to aggregate consumption rather than to derivation of revenues; establishing a single
‘location’ for each business; and cross-country co-operation and supervision of VAT administration. These
provisions raise a host of concerns about tax administration, equity and incentives. See Smith (1997).
17Under the alternative approach — a subtraction-method VAT — firms add up their sales, subtract their purchases
and pay VAT on the difference. Both methods give the same tax payments when all goods and services are included
in the VAT and are taxed at the same rate. The credit-invoice method facilitates special treatment of different goods
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buyers. The basic idea is that, since the buyer of a good is going to report the
transaction to the tax authorities in order to claim a VAT refund, the seller,
knowing that the buyer will report, chooses also to report, so as not to be caught
evading the tax. The paper trail also assists authorities in audits.
In practice, the British VAT authorities do not match invoices as an
enforcement mechanism, due in part to the belief that doing so would generate only
tiny gains in revenue and compliance. The authorities instead use other methods to
estimate revenue, such as total sales and input purchases. This is obviously an
indirect approach which relies on incomplete information and, if enforced
aggressively, could lead to an intrusive and frequently incorrect tax authority
insisting on inappropriate levels of tax payments.
One of the inevitable problems with taxing different goods at different rates is
that there are no hard and fast definitions for particular good categories. One
famous case involved Jaffa ‘cakes’. The VAT authorities claimed that the product
was a biscuit, while the Jaffa company claimed it was a cake, which would face a
lower VAT rate.
18 Similar problems arise in the taxation of many other goods.
Another problem is the taxation of services, where the absence of a physical
inventory makes auditing and enforcement more difficult.
VAT can also be complex in other ways. For example, many small businesses
are exempt from VAT. Thus the number of firms in the VAT system exceeds the
number of firms paying VAT, because the former want to receive rebates on their
purchases. In addition, businesses in the VAT system need to keep track not only
of the value of their purchases but their composition as well.
Compliance and administrative costs average about 5 per cent of VAT
revenues (Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick, 1989). This is about half as high as
estimates for the US income tax (Slemrod, 1996) but about the same as the income
tax, capital gains tax and National Insurance scheme in the UK (Sandford et al.,
1989). Compliance costs are heavily weighted toward small firms that pay VAT,
and are a very high proportion of VAT payments for such firms. One reason
compliance costs are high is that VAT is not integrated with business income taxes
for auditing and control purposes.
Evasion rates also appear to be fairly low — around 5 per cent — and evasion
appears to be concentrated in a few sectors, notably small businesses that are just
large enough to have to pay VAT but do not (Sandford et al., 1989). One likely
reason for higher evasion in this sector is the higher compliance costs. Another is
that declaration of sales not only creates VAT liabilities, but also often creates
income tax and National Insurance contribution liabilities for the business owner.
Thus the effective return to evasion may be much higher for small businesses than
that indicated by the VAT rate alone.
                                                                                                                             
18The company won the case, but a little real-time empirical research revealed that the Jaffa cake looks, feels and
tastes like what the British call a biscuit and, in a sample of one shop, is even sold on the biscuit shelf.What Can America Learn from the British Tax System?
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Although almost no one advocates that the US completely scrap the income tax
and replace it with a VAT, many experts note the viability of reducing the size and
scope of the income tax and replacing the lost revenue with a VAT (Slemrod and
Bakija, 1996; Graetz, 1997). The British experience with VAT, however, is
probably not as satisfactory as one would hope for before signing on to a similar
plan. In particular, a VAT that did not zero-rate or exempt so many goods, that
was integrated with other business taxes in administration and that handled
exports more effectively would represent a better model for the US to build on.
V. CORPORATE INCOME TAX
The corporate income tax is levied against the profits of UK resident companies,
public corporations and unincorporated associations. Deductions are allowed for
interest payments, a limited amount of research and development expenditures,
wages and pension contributions. Depreciation deductions vary by assets. For
equipment and machinery, 25 per cent of the unused basis may be deducted in
each year. Hotels and industrial buildings may be deducted at a 4 per cent straight-
line rate. Unused depreciation deductions and losses may be carried back for three
years and carried forward indefinitely.
In 1996–97, taxable income faced a marginal tax rate of 24 per cent on the
first £300,000 of profit and of 35.25 per cent on profits between £300,000 and
£1.5 million. Both the average and the marginal tax rates were 33 per cent on
profits above £1.5 million.
The British corporate tax is partially integrated with the individual income tax.
When a company pays a dividend, it pays an additional 25 per cent of the amount
in ‘advance corporation tax’ (ACT). For tax purposes, shareholders are deemed to
have received both the dividend and the tax payment and to have remitted
payments in the amount of the ACT to the Inland Revenue. The tax payment is
also credited against the corporation’s income tax. The net effect is that, for
dividends paid to certain taxpayers, there is no change in net tax revenues.
For example, consider a firm that pays £100 in dividends. Under current law, it
is required to send a cheque to the Inland Revenue for an additional £25, as the
ACT. (This is considered a 20 per cent ACT rate, because £25 is 20 per cent of
the ‘grossed-up dividend’ of £100+£25.) The firm credits this payment against its
corporate income tax, so that the dividend does not change the firm’s total tax
payments. (The ACT can be carried back six years and forward indefinitely.)
The shareholder receives dividends of £100, and is deemed to have received
£125 in income and to have paid £25 in taxes. Thus if the investor is in the 20 per
cent tax bracket, there are no further tax consequences. The deemed £25 in tax
payments exactly offsets the deemed £125 in income, so that the dividend does not
change tax payments for the shareholder. However, a shareholder in the 24 perFiscal Studies
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cent bracket would owe an additional £5, and a shareholder in the 40 per cent
bracket would owe an additional £25.
19
The ACT credit is a major feature of corporate taxation. In 1995–96,
corporation tax raised £24.7 billion. By way of comparison, ACT totalled £9.9
billion — 40 per cent of corporate tax revenue and 3.6 per cent of all tax revenue.
Historically, pension funds, which are tax-exempt, could receive refundable
ACT credits on their dividend receipts. Because dividends paid to taxpayers in the
20 per cent tax bracket have no net revenue consequences, credits given to pension
funds reduce overall tax revenue. That is, if the dividend had not been paid, tax
revenue would have been higher. Thus the payment to pension funds represents not
just a tax exemption, but a partial refund of corporate taxes.
The extent of integration has declined in recent years. The Conservative
government cut the ACT rate from 25 per cent to its current 20 per cent in 1993.
The new Labour government proposed in July 1997 to eliminate ACT refunds for
pension funds immediately and for other zero-rate taxpayers in 1999. Another
Labour proposal would reduce the rate of tax credit to 10 per cent starting in
1999. At the same time, Labour has proposed reducing the top corporate tax rate
to 31 per cent from 33 per cent.
The stated intent of these changes is to encourage investment by reducing the
tax rate on corporate profits and encouraging retained earnings. But while raising
the tax on dividends might encourage firms to reinvest earnings, it would also raise
the overall taxation on corporate earnings. It is thus not obvious that the proposed
policy would encourage investment in the long run.
Caution is required in translating these patterns into lessons for the US. Partial
corporate integration is feasible and suggesting it does not appear to have created
a political firestorm, but it could be quite expensive. The effects of partial
integration on corporate investment and dividend policy in Britain are of particular
interest, but are difficult issues. Since 1985, both investment and the ratio of
dividend payments to GDP have soared in Britain relative to the US. It is not
obvious that such trends are largely attributable to tax policy, though.
VI. THE POLL TAX
20
The British experience with the community charge, or poll tax, is a fascinating
chapter in recent tax history. Before the poll tax, local government in Britain was
financed by a combination of grants from central government and local business
and residential property taxes. The latter are referred to as ‘the rates’ because the
tax liability was determined by multiplying the notional rental value by a tax rate
                                                                                                                             
19The shareholder in the 24 per cent bracket would owe total taxes of £30 (=0.24×125), but would have been
deemed to have paid £25 already. The shareholder in the 40 per cent bracket would owe total taxes of £50
(=0.40×125), but would have been deemed to have paid £25 already.
20Smith (1991) and Besley, Preston and Ridge (1997) provide detailed and informative studies of the poll tax.What Can America Learn from the British Tax System?
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set annually by the local authorities. The central government grants were often
called block grants, but had important matching elements.
This system of local finance was criticised on several grounds, some seemingly
more reasonable than others. Rental values were not always adjusted
appropriately. Because of the matching elements of central government grants,
local governments and their residents did not bear the full marginal costs of
decisions to raise local spending. Property taxes varied substantially across
localities, which, according to Smith (1991), gave rise to apparent inequities
across regions. Finally, because only the head of household was legally liable for
property tax, there appears to have been a (mistaken) notion that very few people
had to bear the burden of local property taxes, making the general public less
accountable for the costs of local decisions and placing unfair burdens on those
who paid property tax.
The Thatcher government wanted, in general, to introduce more local
accountability for local spending and, in particular, to reduce the level and
improve the efficiency of local spending. This was to be accomplished, across
localities, by requiring each locality as a whole to internalise the entire cost of its
marginal increases in expenditures and, within localities, by requiring the
increased costs to be spread over all voters.
Toward this end, a new system of local finance was implemented in Scotland in
1989 and in England and Wales in 1990. The business property tax was altered:
business property was revalued, and rates were to be set by the national, rather
than local, government. The residential property tax was abolished and replaced
with a community charge, an equal tax on each adult in a locality. There were a
limited number of exemptions, and there were rebates of up to 80 per cent for the
poorest individuals. The central government grant was set so that, if a locality
spent funds at its assessed needs level, the local community charge would equal a
national standard level. Each pound by which local spending exceeded its assessed
needs had to be financed from the poll tax. The poll tax was intended to represent
about one-quarter of local government revenues. Thus raising local spending
above the assessed needs level by, say, 15 per cent would require a 60 per cent
increase in the local community charge.
21
Both the conceptual basis and the implementation of the poll tax were severely
lacking. On the implementation side, central government gave little thought to
enforceability, transition or intergovernmental issues. Unlike property, residents
are mobile. Annual population turnover rates were as high as 36 per cent in some
rural areas and up to 55 per cent in inner London. This made it quite difficult to
ensure that people registered for the tax. Local governments recognised the
compliance problems immediately and opposed the legislation on those grounds.
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Smith (1991) notes that, in response to their opposition to the tax, local
governments may have set the tax higher than it needed to be. That is, they may
have used the change in regimes as a way to increase their own spending,
gambling that the concomitant increase in taxes would be blamed on the central
government and would increase the unpopularity of the tax. Recall that even small
increases in local spending would generate large percentage increases in the
required poll tax. The average poll tax ended up being 30 per cent higher than
predicted and more than double what was proposed in 1987.
The tax change redistributed resources across regions and across families
within regions. The major regional ‘winners’ were areas with high property values
in south-east England, an area with strong Conservative support. Within regions,
multi-adult households lost relative to single-adult households. In response to the
losses created by redistribution, the national government set up a safety net of
compensating payments from ‘winning’ regions to ‘losing’ regions, to be phased
out over several years. This system proved inadequate in several dimensions. It
raised costs and reduced support for the poll tax in the ‘winning’ regions, it did
nothing to address within-region redistribution across families and it only
redistributed local burdens — it did not reduce the overall local burden, on
average.
On the conceptual side, the tax change replaced a set of taxes based loosely on
ability to pay with one based loosely on the benefit principle. Smith (1991),
however, argues that a poll tax is an inappropriate application even of the benefit
principle. While it is certainly true that not all taxes need to be progressive to
make the overall tax system progressive, it seems clear that voters rejected the idea
that, for example, Buckingham Palace staff should have to remit more in
community charges than royalty themselves.
Moreover, while the poll tax clearly raised the local marginal costs of
increasing expenditures, Smith (1991) argues further that it may have done little to
improve accountability, since voting mechanisms in general are not efficient and
local choices in particular were often constrained by national parties. Thus
localities received the burden of higher marginal costs without much in the way of
increased autonomy.
For all of these reasons, the poll tax came to be regarded as extraordinarily
unfair and ultimately unmanageable. Non-payment campaigns developed and
estimated non-payment rates reached 50 per cent in some areas. A Member of
Parliament was arrested for not paying the tax. More than 20 per cent of
taxpayers required a summons before paying the poll tax, seven times higher than
the proportion requiring a summons under the old property tax. Non-compliance
was not due primarily to unfamiliarity with the tax, since non-compliance rates
rose over time (Besley, Preston and Ridge, 1997). The administrative costs of
local taxes tripled in the first year of the poll tax. Disapproval rates reached 90 per
cent.What Can America Learn from the British Tax System?
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In the second year, the central government provided some overall transition
relief in the form of reducing the burden of the poll tax, but the die had been cast.
The poll tax was abandoned shortly thereafter, by the Conservative Party that
proposed it in the first place, on the grounds that it was uncollectable.
The new council tax, initiated in 1993, is a function of property value and the
number of adults in the household and raised about 20 per cent of local revenue in
1995–96. Properties are placed in certain bands based on their value in April
1991. The rate structure applied to the bands is determined by the national
government,
22 but the rate levels are determined by local government. This system
allows the national government to control the progressivity of the tax burden, but
lets the local government determine the overall level of the tax burden (and
spending).
There is obviously much to learn from these events. Smith (1991) lists some
appropriate conclusions: the importance of administrability and equity in
determining whether a tax can remain in place, and the need for transition relief if
significant tax restructurings are to be politically palatable. Besley, Preston and
Ridge (1997) note emerging compliance problems in the council tax, and suggest
that this may be an effect of the poll tax. Hence the longer-run effects on
compliance may also be important. They also note that compliance can present
problems even in countries with a well-developed tax and monitoring system.
One odd aspect of the entire episode, from an American perspective, is the
extent to which central government can dictate local tax policy. This raises
obvious issues of autonomy as well as principal–agent problems. The central
government wanted to change the behaviour of local governments in a way that the
locals resisted. To accomplish this goal, the central government needed and
expected the co-operation of local governments. There is some evidence to suggest
that such co-operation did not occur. The agency problems that arise when one
government is expected to enforce another government’s taxes is a little-explored
area of public finance. The issue relates directly, however, to proposals that would
establish a national retail sales tax in the US to be collected by the states.
A final set of observations falls under the general category ‘an old tax is a good
tax’. The property tax clearly suffered from technical complexities in determining
rental values and political difficulties in adjusting values. But Besley, Preston and
Ridge (1997) describe the property tax as a 600-year-old system that faced little
non-compliance and was based, at least loosely, on ability to pay. Smith (1991)
notes that the property tax was easy to administer. This is not to say that all taxes
should stay the way they are, just that major changes in taxes should take careful
account of the costs and benefits of the existing and new systems, as well as of the
transition costs of establishing the new system. Moreover, the fairness, or
perceived fairness, of new taxes that are quite different from the ones they replace
                                                                                                                             
22For example, property in one band is assigned a rate of 1 while properties in other bands are assigned rates ranging
from 
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appears to be an important constraint on policy options. In short, the poll tax
episode is, among other things, a case in point about the dangers of overselling the
theoretical and empirical advantages of tax reform and about ignoring fairness,
transition and administrative considerations in developing new tax proposals.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The British and American tax systems have much in common, several important
differences and experiences, and much to learn from each other.
One major theme is that the structure and administration of the British income
tax are much simpler than those of its American counterpart. It seems quite
plausible that differences in administrative arrangements led to important
differences in the structure of income taxes in the two countries. This could have
happened directly, in that some tax subsidies are simply too difficult to handle in a
no-return system. Or it could have happened indirectly, in the sense that when
people do not file tax returns very often, they do not immediately look to the tax
code as the natural way to subsidise various activities.
In any case, the British example shows that the US income tax could be much
simpler if Americans were willing to reduce the extent to which the income tax
attempted to tax all income or tried to administer social policy through the tax
code. A larger issue, unexamined here, is whether the resulting tax–transfer system
would end up being more efficient and equitable.
A second major difference is the importance of consumption taxes in the UK
relative to the US. The experience of Britain and other countries shows that a
VAT could be established in the US to replace a substantial component of income
tax revenues, but that VATs are neither as simple, nor as much of an elixir for
growth, as is sometimes claimed. Also, the willingness of the population to accept
VAT, in the UK and in other countries, may be conditioned heavily on social
spending programmes that are more generous than those found in the US.
It would be of great interest to pursue the behavioural effects of these
differences in tax policy: that is, do taxes matter? Detailed investigations along
these lines are beyond the scope of this paper, but it is interesting to note that,
despite the virtual elimination of mortgage interest subsidies and of capital gains
taxes, Britain is neither suffering from a collapse in housing nor benefiting from
an extraordinary boom in investment and entrepreneurship. As these are two of the
most controversial sets of issues in America, further investigation is clearly
warranted.
It would also be interesting to pursue further the role of differing political
systems and institutions in the conduct of tax policy (see also Keen (1997)). The
party in control in the British parliamentary system often has much more power
than the majority party in the US Congress. Thus one might imagine that parties
with such extensive authority could push through tax breaks for whatever
favoured constituency they chose. Yet the British system seems, at least at aWhat Can America Learn from the British Tax System?
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distance, to be remarkably devoid of such loopholes, at least relative to the
American system. Why that is the case would be an interesting further ‘lesson’ for
America. One possibility is the differing role of campaign contributions in the two
countries (Keen, 1997; Graetz, 1997).
Recent changes in the income tax and the corporate tax suggest that Britain
may be moving in the direction of the American tax system in certain ways. It is
difficult to know what to make of this development. It seems unlikely to be due to
any inherent superiority of the American approach to taxation. Rather, the change
may be best interpreted as part of the cyclical variation one would naturally expect
as taxpayers and political leaders continue to make trade-offs between policies that
support the conflicting goals of equity, efficiency, simplicity and revenue
requirements.
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